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To the Sound of the Guns
Canadians and Coinbat Surgery,
1938-1953
Bill Rawling
ombat surgery is almost as old as battle itself
- the Iliad contains many an example of
surgical intervention to heal wounds and in
the modem era, the surgeon has become an
almost saintly figure in the public imagination,
especially in a context where human beings are
actively engaged in killing one another. Myth is
not far removed from fact, and there is no doubt
as to the dedication of these men (women did
not enter the field until very recently), but that
still begs a few questions: how did they operate
(in both the military and medical senses of the
word) and how successful were they? This
account traces the challenges Canadian
surgeons faced in the Second World War and
Korea as they sought solutions to problems
medical (such as shock) and tactical (operating
within range of enemy fire). It is, in effect, a
story of civilians attempting to apply their
knowledge under the severe stress of battle.

C

*****

llThen Norman Bethune left Canada for China

VV in 1938, he could not have gone further in
time and space; for he did not travel to the China
of Shanghai, or Peiping, or even Nanjing, but to
the north-west, where little had changed in
hundreds or even thousands of years. There,
almost invisible to Europe and North America,
pitched battles were being fought between armies
of hundreds of thousands of troops as the
communist Chinese and the Japanese Empire
made war against each other. Bethune had
already gained fame helping to organize blood
transfusion units in Spain, and his ideological
credentials were certainly in order, but the
medical challenge that faced him as he made his
way across China to join the 8th Route Army

was immense. A formation of 200,000, with
2500 in hospital at any given time, it had
available only five doctors and 50 apprentices. 1
The Canadian had his work cut out for him.
Coming to grips with the role of the surgeon
in modern war, in the last two months of 1938
the Marxist doctor from Montreal carried out
work which would have been familiar to his
Huguenot and Scottish forebears. Referring to
the prevalence of bone infection in certain
wounds, he wrote:
All osteomyelitis cases, involving the thigh,
should have amputation as the quickest and
most humane method of getting them out of
hospital. It should be kept in mind, that,
irrespective of whether or not these cases are
treated conservatively or radically, that they will
never be able to return to the front and their
usefulness, as soldiers, is finished. We dislike
as much as they, to be forced to amputate, but it
is the most merciful procedure. At least we have
saved their lives, even though they have only one
leg, and in addition, have saved them months
and possibly years of suffering which, even
though they endure, will leave them with a leg
which is not capable of bearing weight. In
addition, to leave them in their present condition,
with uncontrolled infection of the bone, is merely
to await a slow death from chronic sepsis. So,
all would point to amputation or nothing done. 2

A surgeon of the Napoleonic Wars would have
agreed.
In another sphere, however, the Canadian
attempted to innovate, and went about it in his
usual bull-in-the-china-shop style. On 22
November, he and his staff began operating on
35 wounded soldiers who had spent three days
in transit. Bethune reported that he berated the
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Above left: Dr. Norman Bethune performs surgery in an unused Buddhist temple in central Hopei, China,
Spring 1939. Above right: Bethune examines a young casualty of war in China, 1938.
(NAC PA 114795 & PA 114786)

brigade commander, who "promised that on the
next occasion of a planned action, that our
Mobile Unit should be placed immediately
behind the regiments in action, to render
operative First Aid." 3 A week later the situation
had already improved, the Canadian gleefully
noting that "We received our first patient at 5:15
p.m.- seven hours and 15 minutes after he had
been wounded. "4 In all, he and his team operated
on 71 cases, of whom only one, suffering from
near-hopeless wounds to the abdomen,
succumbed. After further work of this nature,
Bethune was much encouraged. "We have
demonstrated to our own satisfaction and I hope
to the satisfaction of the Army commanders the
value of this type of treatment of wounds. It is
expected that it will revolutionize our present
concepts of the duties of the Sanitary Service.
The time is past and gone in which doctors will
wait for patients to come to them. Doctors must
go to the wounded and the earlier the better.
Every Brigade should have at its disposal such
a Mobile Operating Unit such as ours. "5 Making
a similar report to supporting committees in New
York, Hong Kong, and London, the surgeon
punctuated his argument with a compelling
anecdote.
I will mention the two cases of perforation of the
intestine by rifle bullets operated on. The first
case was operated on 18 hours after wounded
and the second 8 hours after being wounded.

Both cases had almost identical wounds - the
bullet entering the abdomen at the level of the
umbilicus. Both had ten perforations and tears
of the small and large intestine with escape of
intestinal contents into the abdominal cavity
(including round worms!) Also there was in both
cases a big hemmorrhage from tear of the
mesenteric artery with the abdomen full of blood.
Both were operated on at night in a dirty
Buddhist temple by the light of candles and flash
lights. The first case died the following day but
the second made an uneventful recovery, in spite
of being transported 60 li [roughly 30 kilometres 1
every night for the following week on a rough
stretcher. The difference between life and death
was the difference between 8 hours and 18
hours. 6

It was, however, the recommendation of a
lone Canadian working in the hinterland of the
largest continent on earth, and when Bethune
died on 12 November 1939 his ideas had not
percolated beyond the Chinese army he worked
with. They re-emerged independently two years
later in a report by Lieutenant-Colonel J.A.
MacFarlane, consulting surgeon to the Royal
Canadian Army Medical Corps, who noted that
"For some time the whole question of operating
facilities in the forward area with motorised units
has been under consideration. " 7 Sweeping
battles in Syria and East Africa had shown that
Casualty Clearing Stations (somewhat rearwards
in the casualty evacuation organization, behind
stretcher-bearers, Regimental Aid Posts,
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Advanced Dressing Stations, and Main Dressing
Stations) were incapable of sufficient mobility
to operate on a flowing battlefield, while Field
Ambulance units, though well-mounted on a
variety of vehicles and operating close to the
front, lacked the necessary equipment for
anything but the most rudimentary surgery. The
solution was obvious: form a mobile operating
unit, perhaps with sufficient dressings and
supplies for 30 to 50 surgical operations, capable
of being carried in a few trucks. Thus, in a rapid
campaign, patients could be transported by
ambulance to some form of forward operating
post before being evacuated further to the rear.
A colleague of MacFarlanes, a divisional
Director of Medical Services, R.M. Luton, agreed
with the need for such a unit in "a campaign of
rapid movement," suggesting the army acquire
specially constructed vehicles on 3-ton chassis.
Other equipment would include a generator for
keeping lights burning, a 60-gallon water tank,
sufficient linen for 30 to 40 operations, and a
15-hundredweight truck for carrying baggage,
rations, and personnel. The surgeon and nursing
sisters would travel in a station wagon. As for
staff, he suggested a surgeon "who must have
sound training and experience in all branches
of traumatic surgery, preferably young, and must
be of good physical condition. "8 Completing the
team would be another surgeon with hospital
experience in traumatic surgery, an anaesthetist,
two nursing orderlies, and two nursing sisters,
though the latter would only join a given unit at
the discretion of the Corps' Deputy Director of
Medical Services. The military hierarchy was
uncomfortable with the possibility of women
working close to the front.
In the first days of 1942, therefore, it seemed
that the creation of forward surgical units had
been worked out in every detail, but the very
concept of such an organization was still a
subject for debate, and the proper location for a
surgeon was not, in the eyes of some, near the
fighting. One divisional Deputy Adjutant General,
Beament by name, insisted that:
In clearing a battle field, the first consideration
is, as far as possible, to evacuate surgical cases
to as far back a fixed hospital installation as
possible. The theoretical ideal, therefore, would
be if one could evacuate directly from collecting
posts in the battle area to a general
hospital. .. This desirable feature of making long

evacuations to rear areas is in many surgical
cases considerably aided by the development in
medical science. I am now informed that in many
cases of gunshot wounds it is now possible to
pack the wounds with a sulphanilamide dresstng
and the wounded man will keep without
operative treatment and without danger of
gangrene for about 48 hours. 9

Beament thus concluded that surgeons would
be needed in the rear, not in the battle zone,
though there were still arguments for some form
of forward surgery, if on a small scale. For" cases
will undoubtedly occur, where early operative
treatment would result in the eventual recovery
of the soldier ... Further, it seems to me that it
would be unfortunate, from the point of view of
morale, if the idea were to become prevalent that
surgical cases, who could not wait to reach a
rearward installation, were abandoned to die."
He therefore supported the creation of one
surgery team per division.
Thus by June 1942 the function and
organization of such a unit was ready to move
from theory to practice, MacFarlane describing
its role as follows: "Mobile warfare has presented
a new problem to the surgeon, he must put
himself, his assistants and the essentials of
equipment into vehicles which can move [as]
quickly as the armoured division which he now
serves. He must be prepared to set up his theatre
in whatever shelter he can find, and do it quickly.
He must be able to disband it rapidly and move
forward to another area on short notice, and
unfortunately sometimes he must be ready to
move it rearwards out of enemy hands when the
battle sways against his comrades. "10 The
consulting surgeon to the Canadian Army
concluded that "I am convinced that something
of this sort is the answer to the problem of
bringing early surgery to the wounded in this
war."
The result was the Field Surgical Unit, or
FSU, though it would be more than a year before
Canadian surgeons followed troops into battle.
(Dieppe being designed as a raid, all casualties
that did not fall into enemy hands were dealt
with in hospitals in Britain.) In Operation Husky,
the landings in Sicily of 10 July 1943, one
practitioner reported how "John R. and I started
operating about 24 hrs after landing- i.e. a filthy
stable using the equipment that an English FSU
had brought ashore in packs on their backs
59
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At a regimental aid post north of Ortona in early 1944, a wounded soldier, with multiple shrapnel
wounds peppering his back, undergoes treatment at the hands of Corporal Quinton Carsell. Note
the use of a hypodermic, which would not have been allowed in the hands of other than a nurse or
doctor in the civilian world.
(NAC PA 193909)

we next worked in a wine cellar, then a house, a
tent, a school, a cathedral and finally a school." 11
Their task was a reflection of war as a whole,
cases arriving in batches so that "our work is
anything but steady- periods of rush alternating
with longer periods of idleness." Job satisfaction
was ephemeral, surgeons having no opportunity
to follow up on their cases after they were
evacuated, "so cannot tell whether our work is
good or bad." Their ability to deal with some
traumas, however, was sadly clear; six abdominal
wounds died out of 11 who reached their hands,
as did five of 15 penetrating chest wounds. And,
if they needed any reminding, infection still
threatened to kill the patient of the most skilfull
surgeon.
Nos 1 and 2 FSUs supported Canadian
ground forces in their advance across Sicily and,
as the Germans completed their evacuation of
the island, there was an opportunity to derive
what lessons they could by those whose task it
was to patch up the "accidents" of war. Between
them, the two units performed 229 major
surgical procedures.
The types of cases were mainly serious extremity
wounds, abdominal cases, sucking wounds of

chests, and bums. The fatal cases were for the
most part abominal cases, sucking chest
wounds, severe bums and cases of clinical gas
gangrene. 24 Abdominal cases were operated on
at an average of 7.7 hrs after being wounded.
The mortality rate was 54%. Only 2 cases seen
within 24 hrs of injury were refused operations
because it was felt they could not survive any
surgical procedure. The mortality in sucking
wounds of the chest was 22% (5 deaths in 23
cases). The mortality in wounds of extermitis
[sic?] including bums was 11%. 12

Most of the bum victims were undoubtedly tank
crews, though the worst mortality rate was to
gas gangrene, four of five patients who suffered
from this First World War horror dying of its
effects; penicillin use from 1943 on would prove
only a partial remedy.
As Bethune had noted four years earlier,
competent surgery is not enough- the patient
needs a high level of post-operative care if he is
to survive. So, as the Canadians moved from
Sicily to Italy and began making their slow,
slogging way northwards, their medical units
worked to get more of their services forward. An
added incentive to performing some surgeries
as close to the front as possible came with the
creation of transfusion teams, small units that
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usually set up shop near dressing stations.
Through their ministrations, they saved the lives
of many who would otherwise have died of shock
brought on by blood loss, but to take advantage
it was best that operations be performed before
the patient was transported any great distance,
bumping over the tracks of Italy often sending
the patient into a relapse. Even after surgery,
not all patients could be moved without serious
risk, hence the need for forward nursing. 13
According to G. W.L. Nicholson, "To be a nursing
sister serving in a field surgical unit, close enough
to the forward troops to be within range of the
enemy's guns, was an envied role to which few
nurses did not aspire." 14
By the time Canadian medical units still in
Britain began their final preparations for the
landings in Normandy, then, they had the
benefits of lessons learned in Sicily and Italy.
One of these was reflected in the fact that there
were two FSUs per division instead of one.
Another was seen in training, as John Burwell
Hillsman later related in his autobiography,
Eleven Men and a Scalpel.

Unit and in combination with other Field
Dressing Stations." 16
Hillsman and his team were put to work after
the landings of 6 June, and their first operation
can serve to demonstrate not only the surgical
and other knowledge necessary for the task, but
the leadership skills required as well.
The time came for us to perform our first
operation. The boys were standing by scrubbed
and grtnning but it was obvious that they were a
little nervous. I went into the Resuscitation Tent
and had a talk with the Transfusion Officer. The
tent was full of wounded but I chose a trivial
wound of the arm for our first case. I didn't want
to take on a big case until the men's nervousness
had cleared a bit. The case was brought in. The
arm was painted and the operation began. Soon
we were through. As I put on the bandage I
noticed the men were laughing and joking among
themselves, proud as peacocks. I slipped into
the Resuscitation Tent and chose an abdominal
case. It went smoothly. From then on we took
the cases as they came. By morning we were a
weary, happy Unit - and I knew I had a team
that could work with the best. 17

Our first consideration was to teach the men to
erect the tent under varying conditions. We spent
three weeks literally living in mud, putting up
the tent and taking it down. The canvas was wet
and heavy but we soon got to the point where we
could set up in blackout conditions in twenty
minutes and take down in fifteen ...
At nights we practised night driving. Each man
was given map references and required to find
his way to various locations in the blackout by
directing the driver what roads to take and what
tums to make .. .I considered the men sufficiently
trained in map reading when I noticed they
invariably managed to get lost within a few
hundred feet of a pub. 15

As for more sophisticated training, "On the first
of March, 1944, things began to look up. The
invasion was obviously approaching.
Headquarters ordered all seven of the Field
Surgical Units along with two Field Transfusion
Units into the field to be attached to a Field
Dressing Station at Cranleigh. The next month
was spent practising combined set ups with this
Preparation for surgery begins while en route to a
field surgical unit. Here, Private Nicky Deagle
administers plasma to a casualty to prevent his
sinking into shock. Ortona, Italy, 15 January 1944.
(Photo by Alexander Stirton, NAC PA 144980)
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of bitter knowledge that no man has ever been
able to describe. Only by going through it do you
possess it. 18

If at times it was the constant grind of fighting
off death that took its toll, on other occasions it
could be an individual patient that reminded the
surgeon of the limits of modem medical science.
Hillsman particularly remembered one difficult
case of internal bleeding.

Regardless ojthe ruggedness of primitive conditions,
aseptic surgery was still the rule, and all the
necessary instruments were prepared for each case.
(Photo by Alexander Stirton, NAC PA 196286)

That he could rely on people in whom he had
confidence was fortunate, as the doctor would
face very difficult times in the months ahead.
Two examples will suffice. The first occurred
in the ten days leading up to the capture of Caen
on 9 July, when Hillsman and his team "changed
from mere soldiers to war-wise veterans," a
process all medical personnel shared.
We saw the tragic sights from which we were
never to be free for ten long months. Men with
heads shattered and grey, dirty brains oozing out
from the jagged margins of skull bones.
Youngsters with holes in their chests fighting for
air and breathing with a ghastly sucking noise.
Soldiers with intestines draining feces into their
belly walls and with their guts chumed into a
bloody mess by high explosives. Legs that were
dead and stinking- but still wore a muddy shoe.
Operating floors that had to be scrubbed with
lysol to rid the Theatre of the stench of dead
flesh. Red blood that flowed and spilled over
while life held on by the slender thread of time.
Boys who came to you with a smile and died on
the operating table. Boys who lived long enough
for you to leam their name and then were carried
away in trucks piled high with the dead. We
leamed to work with heavy guns rocking and
blasting the thin walls of our tent. We learned to
keep our tent ropes slack so that anti-aircraft
fragments would rain down harmlessly and
bounce off the canvas. We became the possessors

The anaesthetist bent over him. I put on my
gown. The painting and draping were quickly
done. I looked at the anaesthetist. He nodded. A
quick incision ... Furious hemorrhage .. .I can't see!
He's bleeding too fast ... Suction, quick! ... Still
can't see ... A pack! Press hard! ... It's still
flowing ... Big forceps, quick! ... I'll have to clamp
blind ... Oh God, I hope I get it .. .It's no use. It
won't work ... To the main vessel quick. .. Another
incision ... Rapid dissection ... The vessel is
tied ... Back again to the first incision. It's slowed
up but not stopped ... Suction! Pack! Sponge!
Quick! .. .I straightened up ... A sigh of relief. It's
stopped. A quiet voice as from the distance, ''I'm
afraid he's gone. "19

With a fatality rate approaching 20 per cent, the
anaesthetist's words were often to be repeated.
Though the FSUs were made up of
experienced personnel, the Normandy campaign
could still offer much that was novel - if

On occasion, however, other tools were put to use,
such as the spoon in this case. Italy, January 1944.
(Photo by Alexander Stirton, NAC PA 196285)

62

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol6/iss1/6

6

Rawling: To the Sound of the Guns: Canadians and Combat Surgery, 1938–1953

gruesome. One characteristic of Operation
Overlord was the reliance on tactical air power,
including the use of heavy bombers to support
the advance by pounding German defensive
positions. The technique was, however, risky,
and on two occasions in August four-engined
aircraft unleashed their loads on their own
troops, what Hillsman described as "our two
worst surgical experiences." Being close to the
front line, as they were supposed to be, he and
his team found every bed and stretcher filled
within an hour of the bombs having dropped,
with two hundred wounded lying on the ground
outside the operating tent waiting for help. "The
worst feature of these cases was the "blast" lungs.
I lost ten patients in a row on the operating table
and of twenty cases done in two operating
sessions sixteen died within twenty-four hours.
The mortality was so high one capable young
surgeon became so depressed that he asked for
a transfer back to a Base Hospital. "20
The Normandy Campaign, costing the lives
of over 5000 Canadian soldiers, was Canada's
bloodiest battle of the Second World War, which
accounts for the experiences detailed above, and
when the front broke in the last days of August,
medical personnel found themselves busier than
ever. As Hillsman later related, "The situation
was difficult. We were the only Surgical Unit open
to cover the Army moving forward. We had to
handle all the casualties for at least twenty-four
hours. I had no relief surgical team and no
Transfusion Unit with me. We hadn't any blood
or penicillin for the wounded. What's worse we
hadn't an icebox to keep the blood in and it would
only last twelve hours in the heat ... We set up the
canvas and just as we started to sterilize the
instruments the first ambulance rolled in. For
thirty-six hours we operated continuously
without sleep or rest." When it was all over, "I
slept like a drunken man. "21
As the army moved forward, surgical teams
fell farther and farther behind, ammunition,
food, and fuel being top priorities, forcing
medical units to stay off the roads. "Fortunately
the casualties were light but those we were getting
were in bad shape and a few arrived dead who
should never have died at all, "22 Hillsman
complained, but commanders thought they
would lose fewer lives by rushing up combat
supplies and troops to bring the war to an early

conclusion than they would through delayed
medical attention. As we well know, the gamble
failed to pay off, and the war went on for nine
more months, but the military leadership did
not know that at the time. As for the doctors
and their staffs, having been formed into units
designed to perform operations as quickly as
possible, they had to carry out their work in the
knowledge that many of their patients had come
a long way- and already begun their journey to
death- before making it to the operating table.
Meanwhile, as September neared its end,
medical units began to ponder the lessons of the
Normandy campaign, and submitted reports to
enlighten their superiors. Discussion over the
proper location of Field Surgical Units continued,
though the consensus from the FSUs themselves
was that they should co-locate with Field
Dressing Stations-just behind the front- rather
than with Casualty Clearing Stations further
back. Proximity to the fighting was not the only
consideration in arriving at such a conclusion,
it having been found that a CCS, with its varied
responsibilities of sorting, transporting, and
accommodating patients, was not able to handle
the number of cases emerging from an FSU
during peak periods, while the FDS could
allocate all its resources to exactly that task. 23
One correspondent went so far as to suggest that
"FSUs and CCSs are incompatable [sic]." 24
Of course, practitioners also argued that they
had to be close to the front because time was of
the essence, though by the end of the Normandy
campaign some were more specific, one FSU
suggesting six hours, or 10 to 15 miles from the
scene of injury, should be taken as maximums. 25
Another unit noted a paradox, the mortality rate
among chest cases increasing when it operated
far forward, though the reason why was clear;
when located further back, it saw very few such
wounds as victims died before they could make
it to surgery. 26 As for abdominals, these patients
had to be resuscitated immediately, often
requiring two to four bottles of blood and
plasma, and then operated upon as soon as they
were stable. "Delay," one FSU reported, "is only
asking for a fatal result. "27 As we have seen, the
death rate was already high enough, about ten
per cent within 24 hours, half of them from
shock, according to studies done in Italy at this
time. 28
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In both the Mediterranean and north-west
Europe, doctors agreed that competent surgery
was not enough, and continued to insist on the
effectiveness of forward post-operative care,
preferably by nursing sisters whose training was
near-perfect for the task. A report from the Italian
theatre pointed out the problem in great detail,
especially as it related to abdominal cases.
Most officers on post operative wards find their
hands full juggling with gastric suctions.
aspirating chests and in attending to the general
needs of their patients. During the night except
in cases of real emergency no medical officer is
on the wards. Even during the day time patients
just returned from the OR are left to themselves
to come out of the anaesthetic. Blood pressures
are rarely taken and unless the patient is in
extremis no particular attention is paid to him.
It may be that if the same careful observation of
pulse, blood pressure etc were made as in the
post operative ward and the same energetic type
of rescuscitation were carried out that a
considerable number of serious or potentially
serious cases might be saved from a rapid decline
and death. This raises the question when does
resuscitation cease? When the patient goes to
OR? at the end of operation? - or when the

patient is safely past any danger of post operative
collapse?
Careful observation combined with active
methods of resuscitation during the 6-12 hours
immediately following operation would seem to
be the means by which these high mortality
figures can most readily be reduced. If this proves
true it is not unlikely that some will be saved
from "Shock" to die of other causes. 29

An FSU in Normandy added that "Good nursing

is essential and rates in importance with
resuscitation and the operation. Under the
supervision of nursing sisters this care is
certainly improved. "30
While commanders and policy makers sorted
out the lessons of mid-1944, the war marched
on and casualties continued to mount. Even four
months after arriving in north-west Europe,
Hillsman still found some injuries shocking.
"Tank wounds were horrible things to treat. They
are always accompanied by more or less severe
burns and are multiple in nature. The wounds
are not usually from shell fragments but one digs
out pieces of armour plate and large lumps of
hard rubber and nuts and bolts. "31 It was,

As with pre-op, so with post-op, blood was administered whenever
it was deemed necessary, creating a heavy demand.
(NAC PA 196287)
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Nursing sisters. because oj their in-depth training in civilian life. were
deemed crucial at all stages qf the surgical process. Here, Lieutenant
Nursing Sister Lillian White turns a school into a surgical centre.
(NAC PA 196288)

however. the pace of operations that took the
worst toll on surgical staff. and the symptoms of
stress slowly became acute. "One man started
fainting at the sight of blood. I had to send him
back. Another got quite surly and uncooperative. He was one of my best men and I tried
to reason with him without too much success. I
kept him. hoping he would straighten out. A third
youngster began to talk and laugh with a hint of
hysteria. The Corporal reported he had heard
him sobbing in his sleep several times. He would
have to be watched carefully.":12 The surly staff
member eventually had to be returned to
England, though the young soldier showing signs
of hysteria begged for a second chance and served
with the unit until the end of the war.
Medics in north-west Europe. therefore,
must have been thankful for a lull in the

campaigning that began in the first days of
November. so that by the end of 1944 one FSU
could report that it was "A fairly dull 3 months
from the surgical standpoint "33 As the Christmas
season set soldiers' minds to home and happier
times, surgical operations fell into a routine of
treating injuries and dealing with wounds
resulting from raids, firefights, shelling, and
Hitler's weapons of revenge, the infamous V1s
and V2s. At a different level, "'Considerable
controversy still goes on over the siting of
FSUs," 34 though as we have seen the units
themselves had been insisting for some time that
they had to be as far forward as possible. They
had allies, 21 Field Dressing Station, for
example. voiced dissatisfaction with its dual role
as an advanced dressing station and recovery
centre, the staff of the former unable to take good
care of patients in the latter during busy periods.
65
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Instead, it suggested it act as an Advanced
Surgical Centre, with surgical teams and
transfusion units attached. "This would push
surgery and resuscitation farther forward. This
is considered necessary. "35
In arguing to be allowed to operate closer to
the front, surgeons and their supporters were
no doubt thinking of their most difficult cases the fatality rate still hovering around 20 per cent.
As the Allies crossed the Rhine on 23-24 March,
Hillsman noted that his unit had treated its
1000th patient; though a milestone, the nowexperienced surgeon saw no cause for
celebration. "It was appalling to think that nearly
two hundred men had died under my knife in
the last nine months," 36 and there was little
possibility of improvement. After First Canadian
Army fought its way through the Rhineland in
February and March, Major G.F. Penna! of the
3rd Casualty Clearing Section calculated that a
third of those suffering from combined chest and
abdominal wounds died oftheir injuries, partly
the result of post-operative complications due
to respiratory infection on admission or
exhaustion from prolonged fighting. 37
Number 3 Field Surgical Unit's experiences
were similar as it reported a fatality rate of 19
per cent for wounds to the abdomen, accounting
for almost all of the 6 per cent who died of 116
major operations carried out from January to
March. It also noted how combat surgery was a
continuing leaming experience.
During the past quarter we have felt, more than
ever before, how specialized our role as forward
surgeons had become. Almost unconsciously we
find ourselves thinking more and more of the
wound itself- the type of missile, it's course and
what it would hit or miss - the surgery itself
being almost automatic and simple. It is
surprising to fmd how accurate one may be and
how canny one's decision in the thoracoabdominal or glueto-abdominal wound, and yet
there are surprises at every tum and one's best
armament is an open mind. It is, in fact, the
only way to remain sane! 38

Another was to focus not on those who died, but
on the majority who lived, 5 FSU reporting an
abdominal fatality rate of 18.3 per cent, but
suggesting that "Even if 5% died after leaving us
the results are still good."39 In the first three
months of 1945, 162 cases survived out of 198,
so that Major R.B. Eaton, the unit's commander

and chief surgeon, could report that "On the
whole it has been most gratifying."
A positive attitude was perhaps the best
armour for what was to come, the Canadians
having been given the task of liberating the
Netherlands, keeping them in battle from the end
of March to the first days of May. Number 10
FSU reported that "April has been the Unit's
record month," 40 it having to move six times,
mainly in pursuit of 4th Canadian Amoured
Division. "All of our cases ranked high in priority,
the bulk of them resulting from the battles of
the Kusten Canal area. Ambulances carrying
both incoming and evacuated casualties were
obliged to negotiate extremely difficult road
conditions- delays were inevitable. The severity
of the wounding was the greatest we have yet
encountered and exceeded that of our experience
at Bedburg," where the unit had served during
the peak days of the Rhineland campaign, in late
February and early March. "As a comparison of
volume- at Bedburg the Unit operated on a total
of 42 cases in 22 days, of these 27 were
abdominals or thoraco-abdominals; at
Friesoythe the Unit operated on a total of 49
cases in 11 days, 29 of the cases being abdominal
or thoraco-abdominal. There were 15 deaths
during the month, the majority of these had
sustained a degree of trauma precluding
survival. "41 Working conditions were as poor as
the war-ravaged country the unit moved through.
buildings having no glass in their windows; as a
result rapid resuscitation was difficult and some
operations were long delayed. To aggravate
matters, liquid plasma was not available and the
use of dry plasma- a very recent developmentled to numerous negative reactions. The German
surrender of 4 May must surely have come as a
relief.
The end of the war in Europe was not,
however, the end of our story; for though
Canadian surgical units did not serve in Asia
against the Japanese, they did make their way
to Korea after war broke out there in 1950.
Canadian troops began arriving in early 1951,
though at first any forward surgery they required
was done by American or Norwegian specialists
at the now-famous Mobile Army Surgical
Hospitals. Then, With as little delay as possible,
they were funnelled into Canadian channels,
including a Canadian Section at the British
Commonwealth Hospital in Kure, Japan. 42 Later,
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A casualty being evacuated by helicopter in Korea. The helicopter helped to
revolutionize medical care by decreasing the time between wounding and treatment.
(NAC PA 196754)

Number 25 Canadian Field Surgical Team (FST)
made its way to the theatre, operating with the
8055th MASH in mid-1952, then transferring
to the 25th Advanced Dressing Station. 43
Completely set up and running by 25 August,
the team was ready to receive patients from
Commonwealth field ambulances as well as from
the 8055th and Norwegian MASHs. "As X-ray
facilities were still not available at this unit any
casualties sent here were generally first sent to
either the American MASH or Norwegian MASH
where X-rays were taken and debridement
[removal of dead tissue] carried out. At times
some of these casualties were evacuated to the
FST for their initial surgery. However, as
intended, the prime function of this unit
continued to be elective surgery and delayed
primary suturing to avoid evacuation to Japan.
By this means it was possible to return the
soldier to his unit much sooner." 44 Priorities were
thus the same as they had been since the early
days of combat medicine; above all else the
surgeon's duty was to get as many wounded men
as possible back into the fighting.

A cease-fire went into effect in Korea in mid1953, allowing practitioners to ponder what
difference their work had made. In the Boer War,
the British had lost 93 of every 1000 men
wounded, and in the First World War the
Canadians saw 114 per 1000 die after initial
treatment. In the Second World War that figure
dropped to 66, and then dropped again to 34 in
the course of the conflict in Korea. Surgery,
however, did not explain the improvement from
one mid-century war to another, as "Surgical
practices in the management of wounds were
much as they were in 1945."45 Rather, other
factors, such as helicopter evacuation, armoured
vests, and antibiotics helped give the wounded
soldier a better chance of survival. (One should
not, however, exaggerate the impact of the
helicopter. From July 1951 to February 1952
only 31 Canadians were evacuated this way.) 46
Certain techniques aside, in the popular
imagination the MASH units of Korea were the
epitome of combat surgery, but as we have seen
they were in fact examples of an organization
that had been in place since the late 1930s. With
67
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the formation of FSUs and their despatch to
Sicily, Canadians admitted that evacuation
methods had reached their peak of efficiency,
and if soldiers were to be better served by
military surgeons, the latter would have to move
closer to their patients. Surgeons, though noncombatants, had nonetheless to move to the
sound of the guns.
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